Nilüfer Koç, the spokesperson for foreign affairs of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), stated that although two months have passed since Abdullah Öcalan’s call, the Turkish state continues to buy time and has taken no visible or concrete steps toward a solution.

The debate on a political resolution and dialogue, sparked by Mr. Öcalan’s call on 27 February is still ongoing. However, there has been no change in Öcalan’s conditions, which many had hoped would improve following the call. In a recent statement for May Day, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) reiterated their expectation for a change in Abdullah Öcalan’s conditions and emphasized that he must be in a position to directly lead the upcoming congress. Nilüfer Koç spoke to ANF about these developments.

Despite Abdullah Öcalan’s call, there has been no change in the conditions that were identified as the first step. How should this be understood in light of the PKK’s recent statement?

Mr. Öcalan’s call has triggered significant changes over the past two months. It not only initiated a serious public debate, but also created a strong sense of hope across all segments of society. Through his appeal, Mr. Öcalan introduced a strategy that brought everyone into the process, both from within Kurdistan and from the Turkish opposition. We have now left behind two intense months. We have now left behind two intense months. As Öcalan worked to establish common ground with the government, he also took steps to include the opposition. Before expecting any concrete steps, he sent letters to all Kurdish components, and political talks with Kurdish parties were initiated. In doing so, we entered a grey political zone, a shift away from rigid polarization. This marks a new transitional phase, one that can be defined as a non-violent path toward resolution. Whether this transitional moment evolves into the kind of peace people hope for now hinges on the PKK’s latest statement. Mr. Öcalan’s role will be vital in transforming this phase into one of deeper democracy. The only way out of this grey zone is for him to gain the freedom to express himself more actively and to communicate directly with his movement. His “Peace and Democratic Society” call is more than an appeal; it is a political project. It offers a roadmap for accelerating the dismantling of a state policy built on genocide and denial for over a century. To lead this process, Mr. Öcalan must be granted a role, and that requires a fundamental change in his conditions.

How do you assess the state’s stance on changing these conditions?

The state is clearly playing for time. Two months have passed, yet no tangible or visible steps have been taken. This is despite the fact that the 27 February call actually made things easier for the state. Compared to previous negotiation processes, a very different approach was put forward. It was an approach that eased the burden on the state, because the Kurdish side declared its support for what Abdullah Öcalan proposed. The people demonstrated their support in the Newroz squares, and the PKK responded with a ceasefire. The Kurdish side is clear on this matter. As clear as Mr. Öcalan himself. The real issue is that the state has not taken a single step in the past two months. Moreover, there are factions within the state that do not want this war to end. The war has not stopped, and the use of chemical weapons is still being reported. Meanwhile, actors who could play a vital role in building a democratic society are being arrested. There is a growing crackdown on the opposition and on revolutionary forces in Turkey. This is the most dangerous aspect of the situation.

Does this indicate a conflict within the state?

What is clear is that the state did not enter this process willingly. That much is obvious. The internal driving force was the immense resistance of the Kurdish Freedom Movement. For the past ten years, there has been a sustained and powerful resistance, on the guerrilla front, among the people, and within the political sphere. This has exerted serious pressure on the state. In addition, in other parts of Kurdistan, such as Rojava and Iraq, the Kurds’ position has grown stronger. This has transformed the overall Kurdish position across the region. Since the Rojava Revolution, the Kurds have emerged in international diplomacy as consistent, credible, and legitimate counterparts. This has led to significant gains for the Kurdish people and established them as a political actor in the Middle East. For the Turkish state, this has become an increasing source of pressure on its foreign policy.

Have regional changes also caused concern for the Turkish state?

Of course, there are both regional and global developments at play. The rapid shift in Syria, the collapse of the Ba'ath regime in just eight days, created tremendous pressure. In response, the Turkish state has tried to maintain its position not by abandoning its anti-Kurdish stance, but by shifting toward Kurdish alliances as a tactic for survival. The Turkish state is in a fragile and risky position. Rather than embracing a comprehensive political solution, some factions continue to bomb the Medya Defense Zones, even using chemical weapons. At the same time, they target democratic forces, revolutionary movements, and even municipalities in Istanbul. Their goal seems to be the elimination of actors that could represent democratic society in Turkey. Some describe this as a “carrot and stick” policy, but I believe it is more about a certain faction, however small, that still refuses to be convinced and thinks it can achieve results through violence. If this reliance on violence becomes the dominant state policy, the cost will be immense. Even Devlet Bahçeli, chairperson of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), emphasizes this poin. He sees that without the right political strategy, the state could face serious trouble. Clearly, there are those within the state who refuse to acknowledge this. I believe this group remains a minority. To me, what matters most after the 27 February call is that the entire opposition in Turkey embraces Mr. Öcalan’s initiative. That is why I referred earlier to this moment as a “transition phase” or “grey zone.” We have reached that point. And that, in itself, is a tremendous achievement.

After the 27 February call, there were positive statements from international powers, yet no concrete steps were taken. Are you engaging in any international efforts in this regard?

At the international level, the steps taken by the Kurds under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan are viewed as reasonable. At the very least, this process offers the possibility of freeing Turkey from its aggressive foreign policy that has long pressured Western powers and contributed to forced migration. What Mr. Öcalan proposes is also a project that could help resolve the migration crisis. Germany, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and even the United States (US) are struggling with this issue. It was one of the first topics Donald Trump raised upon taking office. Mr. Öcalan’s initiative offers a path to resolving it. At the same time, Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy relies on certain tools. Chief among them is the instrumentalization of Islam. These are policies that have fragmented society, radicalized certain segments, and pushed them toward aggression. This dynamic must and will change. There has been an ongoing war in the Middle East for 35 years, and Turkey has played the role of pouring fuel on the fire. Because of this, Turkey is a state that is increasingly criticized on the global stage.

In light of all these factors, Mr. Öcalan’s call has been received with approval. Through this initiative, he has shown that an alternative path is possible and took the first step himself. Mr. Öcalan stands firmly for a non-violent solution. Interest in his call continues, particularly among state actors. However, I must say that the Turkish state has shown no sign of being persuaded. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to build its diplomatic efforts around anti-Kurdish hostility. Even as Devlet Bahçeli or President Erdoğan speak of a Turkish-Kurdish alliance, their foreign policy continues to foster hostility, not brotherhood. The aim here is to overshadow the hopeful atmosphere that emerged with the 27 February initiative. But I do not believe this strategy will succeed. Everyone in the region now wants stability, at least to some degree.

Do you currently have any contact with international powers in this context?

Many states are sending delegations to both Rojava and Northern Kurdistan. I believe these states are beginning to reassess their approach to the Kurdish question and to the Kurdish people, particularly their stance on the PKK and Mr. Öcalan. Until now, concessions granted to Turkey through its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have always been based on anti-Kurdish policies.  This must change. A shift in positioning is necessary. It seems that some states are beginning to recognize this. At the moment, they are in a phase of observation and assessment, trying to better understand the situation.

What will Kurdish diplomacy do at this stage?

It is crucial to explain that the current foreign policy of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually contradicts domestic political discourse. The language used by both Devlet Bahçeli and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan differs significantly from the messages conveyed in Turkey’s foreign policy. I do not believe this foreign policy approach will yield any meaningful results. Wherever Kurds build a system, it does not harm anyone’s interests. On the contrary, Kurds demonstrate a highly democratic and consensus-oriented approach. I believe this is both well-implemented and increasingly visible. The past 13 years of the Rojava experience, along with the way the Kurdish people in Northern Kurdistan support the opposition through elections based on democratic principles, show that there is a determined struggle for the democratization of Turkey.

This situation enables Kurds to act as political and diplomatic agents. However, convincing states requires more than a few reports from foreign ministries or embassies. States operate through deeply rooted institutional traditions. Foreign policy is not shaped solely by foreign ministries. We have now reached that level of engagement and that is a significant achievement. For example, Germany’s recent statement was the most advanced of all. They welcomed Abdullah Öcalan’s statement and expressed readiness to support the process. If realized, this would mark a break from a 300-year tradition in German-Turkish relations. Changing such a long-standing tradition will not happen overnight, but we have the infrastructure and capacity to engage these states and work toward that shift.

With the 27 February statement, a new path has opened up for these countries to view the Kurds as partners and friends. Some powers are observing the situation very closely. One of the key questions they ask is: “Could we also take part in this resolution process?”

Another frequent question concerns the presence of a guarantor for the process. At this moment, Mr. Öcalan has taken on the role of guarantor himself. This represents a new development in the context of conflict resolution and negotiations since the Cold War era. Mr. Öcalan has introduced a very different model. Some observers are surprised, asking, “How can the final stage of negotiations, disarmament, be presented as the first proposal?” In doing so, Mr. Öcalan took everyone by surprise. These international actors are still trying to grasp the depth of this approach. Our responsibility is to explain it. In fact, the diplomatic framework that Mr. Öcalan outlined in 2009 can be described as a “roadmap” for Kurdish diplomacy. The Kurdish diplomatic tradition of negotiation is entirely new in itself. Those who read that roadmap will better understand this process.

The campaign “Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan, Solution to the Kurdish Question,” which has continued for more than two years, has led to significant results. It has created a strong dynamic that brought the process to its current point. What steps will you take from here to increase international public support?

At this transitional stage, for the process to truly evolve into a democratic path as hoped, Mr. Öcalan must be released from Imralı prison. As long as he remains in Imralı prison, all communication will continue to be under the control of the state. This means that any contact will only happen when the state allows it. Just as they have done for the past 26 years, they cut off all dialogue whenever they wish. Mr. Öcalan’s release and his ability to actively participate and express himself directly in the process would mark a fundamental change. Otherwise, we risk returning to the past. This transitional phase is critical. Öcalan is the key, but everyone must see themselves as an actor in this process and take part in it. The more we build alliances within Turkey, between laborers, Kurds, Alawites, women, young people, and all segments of the democratic society that Mr. Öcalan speaks of, the better the outcome will be.

The same applies to Kurds in Europe. There are millions of people from Turkey living abroad. At the same time, a certain wing of the state maintains a problematic approach, especially in foreign policy, which threatens to derail the process. Kurdish diplomacy can counter this in Europe. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and many other international bodies. I believe that if we become more active in all of these arenas, we can prevent the damage caused by the state’s current foreign policy stance.

On the other hand, Turkey has signed many international agreements. Last year, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe made a decision that must be swiftly implemented by Turkey. We must pressure the Council of Europe to play a more active role in enforcing this. For example, we must raise serious criticism about the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) not visiting Imralı. This moment demands a constructive and positive tone. In his 27 February call, Mr. Öcalan set exactly that tone. He demonstrated his goodwill. Based on that goodwill, diplomacy must be encouraging and remind others of the role they can play. From the Kurdish side, the ground is favorable. What remains is for us to become more active, especially those of us living abroad.