In the second part of this interview, Middle East analyst and Kurdologist Vadim Makarenko spoke to ANF about the developments in the region and said that "hopefully, Mr. Öcalan will have the opportunity to see once again how democratic confederalism works in practice."

The first part of this interview can be read here.

Israel and the United States have dealt significant blows to Iran’s sphere of influence, often referred to as the Shiite Axis of Resistance. Organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah have been severely affected, attacks on the Houthis continue, the Syrian regime has collapsed, and Shiite militias in Iraq are under heavy attack and threat. Meanwhile, nuclear talks have begun between Iran and the U.S. Do you think the new target is Iran? What are the challenges of a potential Iranian intervention and what regional consequences might it have?

The defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria with Iran remaining nearly passive, and the subsequent nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, negotiations that, if successful, could result in the lifting or significant easing of sanctions against Iran, show that Iran is retreating from the Mediterranean region of the Middle East and, like during the Shah era, is ready to focus on its own economic development. However, both the U.S. and Israel will attempt to reduce Iran’s influence in Iraq, and it is highly likely that Iran will also take steps in this direction. It is important to remember that for thousands of years, the Persians have passed through this region of the Middle East, often coming from East Africa. Today, nothing prevents Iran from returning to its borders and gaining strength for the future. Moreover, limiting Iran’s cultural influence in the Middle East is not feasible.

Turkey, with its geopolitical importance in the region, is pursuing a neo-Ottoman hegemony by leveraging the Russia-U.S. contradiction in the Middle East. How do you see Turkey’s future? Is Turkey still an important country as it once was? What role will Turkey play in the changing dynamics and the new design of the Middle East?

The United States and Russia are not confronting each other in the Middle East, but even when issues could be resolved in line with their mutual interests, they do not cooperate. A striking example of this can be seen in Syria. Here, U.S. and Russian joint actions could have led to the establishment of a truly democratic exit from the Assad regime, rather than the creation of a radical Islamist government similar to the Afghan Taliban.

Turkey does not have the resources to become a hegemonic power in the Middle East. It has invested what it has into its current state. Serious growth is not possible; there are no resources, no markets, and no workforce. It cannot compete with the Arab countries in the region (which have endless financial and human resources) or with Israel (which has financial and advanced technology capabilities). This situation does not appear to be conducive to Turkey gaining a foothold in the region. Turkey believes it is isolated in the Middle East; that is why it is showing interest in the Turkic world of Central Asia. However, Russia and Iran do not allow this. I believe Turkey must seek ways to integrate into the Middle East region regardless: there is a market, technology, and finance there, and no one can change that.

The Kurds, a people left stateless in the 20th century and divided among four states, have been struggling in all four parts of Kurdistan to break the existing status quo, which was shaped by the interests of international powers and the mentality of the nation-state. In Rojava, in northern and eastern Syria, they have established a democratic system. Can the Kurdish struggle serve as a model for the destruction of despotic regimes in the Middle East and the creation of a democratic Middle East? What kind of future awaits the Kurds in the new Middle East, considering their statelessness in the 20th century?

The fate of the Kurds is tragic. In a country (1918-1922) facing the risk of fragmentation and almost total annihilation as a significant state, they became a very strong and self-assured minority. After this stress (the Sevres syndrome), the leadership was ready to eliminate anyone suspected of separatism or disloyalty to the authorities. The Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), the Ağrı Mountain Rebellion (1930), and the Dersim Rebellion (1937-1938), initiated by the Kurds to defend their traditional way of life, were brutally suppressed. After the bloody massacre in Dersim, it was not surprising that hostility and hatred against the Kurds escalated, an action that should be regarded as genocide.

In Atatürk's Turkey, the processes of assimilation of the Kurds were actively pursued; the use of the Kurdish language was banned, new names were given to settlements and geophysical structures. All of this allowed Kurdish intellectuals on the left to regard the military-police regime established in dense Kurdish areas as "colonial" and emphasize the need to fight for the liberation of Kurdistan. But the struggle became possible much later, after 1945, in the "democratic Turkey" of İsmet İnönü, who was forced to put the country on democratic tracks and gradually hoped to become part of the Western liberal world. His fate reminds me a bit of Gorbachev’s fate. Like Gorbachev's absolute power, İnönü introduced limited democratic freedoms hoping to retain control over the country, but the process got out of hand; the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) lost the 1950 parliamentary elections and lost power. In the 1960s and 1970s, social unrest in Turkey grew.

The changes seemed radical. After the period of statism, liberal values began to be adopted. The national solidarity that Atatürk had imposed with harsh methods had virtually disappeared; everyone was for themselves, with Turks and Kurds being separate. The 1960 and 1971 military coups, which were expected to extinguish the fire of political struggle, also failed. During this period, ethnically oriented, mostly radical organizations (Bozkurtlar) and parties began to emerge, conflicts between politicians and parties intensified, and political terror (political assassinations) developed. The Kurds also tried to establish their own parties, but by the late 1970s, it was nearly impossible to do so legally.

After an organizational meeting, the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) were forced to flee to Syria, which had many radical elements from all Middle Eastern countries.

The decisions and actions of the PKK leadership were at least controversial and their outcomes were unpredictable. Especially after the 1980 coup, when the military handed power back to politicians, everything started to get back on track. Initially, in 1984, the decision was made to start an uprising on Turkish soil. I have no intention of criticizing the PKK leadership, as everyone looks wise in hindsight. Choosing the right path back then was not easy.

The years of heroic but unequal struggle began, and this undoubtedly contributed to the development of the Kurds' self-consciousness. But there was no chance for a positive political change in Turkey in this way. The Kurds recognized themselves as an independent and united ethnic group, but they also suffered huge losses. The Kurdish issue was completely banned in Turkey. A parliamentarian speaking Kurdish was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Armed conflicts and police repression caused many casualties; thousands of Kurds were imprisoned for long periods, and many died in prison. Thousands of Kurdish villages were destroyed.

This was the reality of the political struggle, but there came a time when the PKK decided to use political methods. After 2002, the PKK underwent significant changes in its activities; many Kurdish politicians turned to legal struggles for the rights of the Kurds. The Kurds also proved in 2015 that they could defend themselves when necessary, but they were not the initiators of the conflicts that year. The conditions in Turkey were and still are extremely difficult. To fight for the rights of the Kurds requires courage and determination. Kurdish-friendly parties are banned, closed down, and members of parliament and politicians can remain in prison for long periods. Yet, political work does not stop. This is the result of the hardening of the Kurds as an ethnic group in Turkey during the 1980s and 2000s, a period that was a test not only for the Kurds but for all of Turkey. As a result, there are now experienced parties in Turkey that genuinely defend and fight for the rights of the Kurdish ethnic group and other people in Turkey. This is a practical struggle for the democratic confederation of peoples.

The experience of the struggle for the rights of the Kurds shows that political and legal work has yielded far more significant results. Unfortunately, from an individual perspective, it is not less dangerous than armed struggle; some may die, others may be saved by fate. Many Kurdish politicians are currently unjustly imprisoned. However, this struggle aims to achieve realistic and attainable goals; modern conditions for armed struggle lead to the isolation of a political party, the blocking of its legal political opportunities, and great harm, resulting in both the weakening of the party and the Kurdish ethnic group.

Therefore, the Kurdish ethnic group is not represented in administrations where important decisions for its existence are made. If legal struggles are pursued, the status of the Kurds, whose numbers, awareness, and unity are increasing, will not be shaken by anyone, as they aim for the fair resolution of practical issues necessary for Turks and other peoples of Turkey, not conflict.

Abdullah Öcalan developed the concept of democratic modernity in opposition to capitalist modernity, arguing that instead of the nation-state, the understanding of a democratic nation and the model of democratic autonomy, and more broadly, Democratic Middle East Confederism, would offer a solution. How do you evaluate Öcalan's philosophical developments and proposed solutions?

The leader of the Kurdish resistance, Abdullah Öcalan, has been imprisoned for more than a quarter of a century. Despite this, he continues to think about the fate of the Kurds and the Middle East, striving to understand the patterns of development in the region and critically evaluating his actions and views.

 Mr. Öcalan's formulation of democratic confederalism is an important step in understanding how deeply divided societies, no matter how attractive they may appear under liberal or socialist guises, can develop peacefully and progressively if they reject full adherence to any ideological dogma. The key to genuine local self-government is that people living in different regions, regardless of their nationality (ethnicity) or religion, solve their problems respectfully and collectively, focusing on common sense and the common good. These groups would unite in democratic confederations, where their interests are represented not by a randomly chosen, well-known guest in parliament, but by someone directly responsible to the group they represent.

This is the first step toward genuine democracy across the country. Local self-governance, which reflects the traditions of the Middle East, where small and large ethnic and religious groups maintained nearly self-governed communities for thousands of years, until the European obsession with creating nation-states arrived, reflects the deep-rooted traditions of the region. The peoples of the Middle East have paid a heavy price for the attempts to impose this European innovation. A century after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the region’s countries are still struggling under the chains of misguided European concepts of societal development. This is why blood is being shed, countries are collapsing, and internal conflicts, including the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, are ongoing. The ideas of democratic federalism will undoubtedly be in demand, bring benefits, and above all, reduce the tensions between ethnic and religious communities.

In Turkey, including the Kurds, the Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation initiative on the agenda of Turkish politicians must succeed this time. Hopefully, Mr. Öcalan will have the opportunity to see once again how democratic confederalism works in practice. It is high time for Turkey to overcome the long-standing and painful Turkish-Kurdish divide in order to remain on par with the societies of the Middle East. And this will make a significant contribution to the collective development of the entire Middle East.