The 1970s are remembered as a period when revolutionary struggle in Turkey once again became rooted in the people and re-established ties with the masses. Within the broader revolutionary movement, these years stand out as a time when revolutionary organizations reconnected with the working class, especially the poor, in ways that were pivotal for building a mass base. In the major cities reshaped by waves of migration from Kurdistan and other regions of Anatolia, a consequence of the Turkish state's long-standing policies of assimilation and forced displacement since the founding of the Republic, revolutionary movements developed inclusive strategies that resonated with Kurdish and Alevi communities. These approaches helped them build meaningful connections and gain public support.

In Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city, one of the most well-known policies of the revolutionary movement targeted the housing crisis faced by newly arrived migrants. Many of these people had come in search of work, a better life, or simply to escape state repression. Revolutionary groups responded by occupying state-owned lands and redistributing them so that displaced families could build homes. Several of today’s neighborhoods emerged in the 1970s as a direct result of revolutionary policies such as “giving land to the people” and “helping them build houses.”

A brief history of 1 Mayıs neighborhood

1 Mayıs neighborhood, named by revolutionaries, is one of the most prominent among these communities. What sets it apart from other poor neighborhoods is that it was entirely established by revolutionaries and the land was distributed directly to the people. Today, it is officially referred to by the Turkish state as “Mustafa Kemal neighborhood,” yet it remains known among locals as a place built and defended by the people and revolutionaries together. For this reason, it holds a significant place in the history of the revolutionary movement in Turkey.

1 Mayıs neighborhood also stands out as a place where the Turkish state's special warfare tactics have been patiently and persistently implemented over many years. In the last decade, the state has extended the experience it gained through such tactics in Kurdistan to neighborhoods in Turkey with strong revolutionary dynamics. Rather than applying open repression from the outset, the state opted for internal disruption, gradually turning 1 Mayıs, once seen as a revolutionary stronghold, into a space plagued by gangs and deepening corruption.

The origins of 1 Mayıs neighborhood date back to the mid-1970s, when revolutionary movements were rising across Turkey. Located in Istanbul’s Ümraniye district, the neighborhood emerged as poor families from Kurdistan and various parts of Turkey moved to the city in search of work. Revolutionaries allocated plots of land to these families and supported them in building their homes. As a result, 1 Mayıs became one of the clearest examples of grassroots self-governance led by revolutionary forces. For years, under threats from the state and fascist groups, the neighborhood remained defiant and continued to feel the strong presence of revolutionary influence.

Revolutionaries once met many of the neighborhood’s needs

When local residents faced problems, they turned to communes organized by revolutionaries. Many of the neighborhood’s essential needs were met through revolutionary structures. The first major attack on the neighborhood came during its early years. On September 2, 1977, demolition vehicles accompanied by police forces arrived to destroy the neighborhood. In the resistance led by revolutionaries, 12 people lost their lives and hundreds of residents and revolutionaries were injured. Yet by the end of the struggle, the police were forced to retreat, and the neighborhood was saved from destruction.

Following the September 2, 1977 attack and resistance, no major assaults were carried out against the neighborhood, except for the daily attacks by paramilitary forces. However, this did not mean the end of aggression. The Turkish state's special warfare policies against 1 Mayıs neighborhood continued gradually and persistently. With each opportunity, the state attempted to pit the people against the revolutionaries through large-scale operations. These policies became fully operational during the 1990s. While the neighborhood had long been a stronghold for Turkey’s socialist movements, it gradually became a center where the influence of the Kurdish Freedom Movement could also be deeply felt. Due to the state’s policies of forced displacement in Kurdistan, including village burnings, executions, and disappearances under detention, many Kurds were forced to migrate to metropolitan cities across Turkey. In Istanbul, they settled in neighborhoods like Gazi, Okmeydanı, Küçük Pazar, and 1 Mayıs. The existing revolutionary infrastructure in 1 Mayıs was revitalized with the arrival of the Kurdish people and the Kurdish Freedom Movement. But this time, the Turkish state began applying the long-term special warfare strategies it had developed in Kurdistan directly to 1 Mayıs neighborhood.

As these special warfare practices intensified, the state encountered the resilience and organizational capacity of the Kurdish Freedom Movement and initially failed to achieve its aims. However, after the internal power struggle following the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish state used this moment as a pretext to reinvigorate its special warfare operations. Pressure increased on neighborhoods known for strong revolutionary presence, 1 Mayıs being one of them. The state accelerated the implementation of policies it had been applying slowly for years, successfully creating a divide between the people and the revolutionaries.

Special warfare tactics were put into effect

The Turkish state distinguishes itself from others through its extensive experience in special warfare. The use of such tactics in 1 Mayıs neighborhood dates back to its earliest years. In the beginning, assaults were mostly carried out using paramilitary forces. However, during the 1990s, these attacks took on a new form. As the Kurdish Freedom Movement gained strength in the neighborhood, offering a significant advantage to revolutionary forces, the state shifted tactics. It embedded itself within the neighborhood and began working to dismantle its revolutionary legacy from the inside. By the late 1990s, the economic crisis that had affected all of Turkey was deeply felt in 1 Mayıs neighborhood as well. Following the massacres in Gazi and Ümraniye in 1996, revolutionary organizations failed to read the political landscape accurately, and the first signs of rupture between the people and the revolutionary movement began to appear.

Revolutionary groups were unable to clearly communicate how the state’s policy of annihilation towards the Kurdish people and the Kurdish Freedom Movement was draining the country’s economy. This failure led to public backlash, distancing, and a decline in mass participation in demonstrations and political activities. During this time, attacks on the Kurdish Freedom Movement increased even in Turkey’s metropolitan areas. The growing disconnect between Turkey-based socialist groups, who failed to explain the root causes of the economic and moral crisis, and the Kurdish Freedom Movement, which was actively conveying its experience and analysis to the people, resulted in rising public dissatisfaction with revolutionary structures. The earliest signs of this shift became visible in the declining participation in street actions. As revolutionary groups failed to see the deepening gap between themselves and the people and could not offer solutions to daily struggles, this disconnection rapidly accelerated.

By the 2000s, even though a revolutionary legacy remained in 1 Mayıs neighborhood, the gap between the people and revolutionary organizations had widened significantly. The Turkish state, exploiting the vulnerability created by poverty, began shaping the people through mechanisms of dependency. Meanwhile, revolutionary groups, unable to provide viable solutions and preoccupied with internal conflicts, often played out publicly, lost their remaining ties with the community. A resident who has lived in 1 Mayıs neighborhood since the 1990s and participated in the Kurdish Freedom Movement reflected on this period: “Leftist groups were fighting their own internal battles in front of the people. Clashes between organizations escalated into armed conflict. Even though the Kurdish Freedom Movement’s efforts to explain the roots of the crisis and propose solutions were welcomed by many, the power struggles within Turkey’s socialist movements pushed people away. That’s when the Turkish state stepped in and began laying the groundwork for moral decay in the neighborhood.”

To be continued...