In the second part of this interview with ANF, academic and author Mehmet Ufuk Uras spoke about the international dimension and the repercussions of the decisions taken at the 12th Congress of the PKK.

The first part of the interview can be read here

Bahçeli outlined a roadmap that defined a clear structure, yet although Numan Kurtulmuş has expressed his support for the process, he seems to be applying the brakes. He said, 'First the weapons must be laid down, and only then can the parliamentary issue be discussed.' How do you interpret this?

This is entirely about the practical aspects of the process. The issue of disarmament is a highly technical matter, yet, for some reason, there is intense curiosity about it in the public sphere. People ask: Where will the weapons be handed over? To which military outpost? But when you’re watching television, do you understand the technicalities of broadcasting? Or when boarding a plane, do you know the mechanics of aviation? Getting lost in such details distracts from the essence of the matter. Let’s say this process wraps up by July or August. There is no fixed sequence of ‘first this, then that.’ These things can and should move in tandem.

In the meantime, the parliamentary commissions mentioned by Bahçeli must convene without delay, so that their work can mature. Once the disarmament process is completed, it is crucial to rapidly implement the constitutional and legal reforms I mentioned earlier. At the core of this issue is constitutional equality.

We know that the DEM Party will hold its congress in the fall. The party will likely undergo a reorganization, and that will be significant.

There is something that the public, especially in the western part of Turkey, often fails to notice. Because they tend to view everything through a Western lens, their historical reading of the Republic has been shaped solely by the Turkish enlightenment. They have overlooked the Kurdish enlightenment entirely. They did not see the transformative process driven by Kurdish society, particularly by Kurdish women and other social dynamics.

What we now have is an opportunity to bring these two memories, these two historical trajectories, into dialogue, to allow them to coexist and enrich one another. Many people are focused on technicalities, but the core of Mr. Öcalan’s manifesto is clear: an era has ended, and the new one can only take shape through democratic politics.

Because a century-old issue cannot be left to spontaneity, nor to the will of foreign powers.

Isn’t the government itself still framing the issue around 'weapons and terrorism'? Statements such as 'How and when will the weapons be laid down?' or 'Our security forces will oversee this,' are still being made. Even the phrase 'A Turkey free of terrorism' is being used. Isn’t this the language of the government itself? What do you think about this?

There are several dimensions to this. One is addressing their own base, to reduce the internal pressure they face. The second is the challenge of constructing a new language. Moving from the negative, toxic discourse we mentioned to one that is more constructive and positive.

I brought this up in my meeting with Mr. Bahçeli. I gave him the following example: Someone asks a religious scholar, ‘Can I smoke while praying?’ The scholar says no. Then he asks, ‘Can I whisper a prayer while smoking?’ and the scholar replies, ‘That would be acceptable.’ Sometimes, the way we frame something, the language we build, is what really matters. And that doesn’t happen overnight.

As you pointed out, the government and its supporting media still operate using the language of the old paradigm. But we must analyze the process, not just isolated moments. Without process analysis, we cannot understand the PKK’s transformation or the broader struggle to transition the Turkish state, from the oppressive legacy of the 1980 military regime toward a democratic and social state, and the need to synchronize those efforts.

Just three days ago, we were being asked: ‘Wasn’t there an attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ)? Wasn’t there a bombing in Rojava? How can this be?’ Yes, all of that happened. It shows that things are moving in zigzags. Of course, it would be better if this progressed through a more streamlined, accelerated process. Unfortunately, it is happening through these fluctuations. That’s just how it is. Saying it shouldn’t happen this way doesn’t change the reality.

We are constantly shown the example of state-appointed trustees. But if those directly affected, like Ahmet Türk or Selahattin Demirtaş, are supporting this process, then those who keep bringing up such objections, often expressing what I would call ‘White Turkish reflexes,’ should stop trying to lecture others and instead start reflecting on themselves. This is not a one-day matter.

I would like to talk about the connection between this process and international developments. When the current phase began, it was said that events centered around Syria, and even Hamas’s attack on Israel, marked a turning point. What is your assessment of this? Why is resolving the Kurdish question seen as important within the current Middle East equation, and why is it viewed as an opportunity?

First of all, the future of Syria must be determined by the Syrian people, not by the United States or by French President Emmanuel Macron. Macron says, ‘The U.S. is withdrawing, so let’s deploy our own troops,’ but clearly, Turkey has had significant influence in shaping the outcome in Syria. On the other hand, Israel’s increasingly aggressive policies have brought the region to a crossroads. In this turning point, we must also consider the cultural dimension, because culture can often shape nearly everything. And in the face of Israel’s genocidal policies, who in the Middle East can genuinely resonate with such a structure?

There is now a strong proposal to open a new page, one in which the process of Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation plays a defining role. That idea is largely what we have observed, and it’s something we have also advocated. In these matters, we preferred that actors within the European Union adopt at least a constructive stance, and indeed, that is what happened. We haven’t really seen many examples of blunt opposition or obstruction.

Of course, there are intelligence dimensions to this. Can some actors, through intelligence operations based in Iran or Israel, attempt to sabotage the process? Possibly, but so far, it hasn’t worked. Take the attack on Özgür Özel, for example. Rather than dividing the public, it triggered an even stronger sense of unity and cohesion in society. Why? Because there is no alternative plan. There is no Plan B. That’s why this process is progressing in a way that seems increasingly irreversible.

We can assess it with the following criteria: Within the context of Turkey, does this process expand or restrict the space for politics? Is it a real opportunity to overcome problems related to democratization and the rule of law in Turkey? Or is it a futile effort? I believe those who see it as an opportunity are right.

When I visited Selahattin Demirtaş in prison last June, he said the same thing to me. He told me that this process is expanding their political space. Therefore, viewing this positively, including supporting constitutional reform, means becoming a part of the process.

But this process is opening the way for a hybrid form of politics, a form of coexistence. We will see many unexpected alliances and unusual situations. As the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) engages in constitutional debates, we will witness the convergence of political actors that we never imagined would stand side by side.

You held meetings with ambassadors through the DPI. What are the prevailing views about the Middle East in those discussions? Is there a vision for a region where Jews, Muslims, Christians, Syriacs, and Armenians can coexist peacefully? Or are the so-called international powers still attempting to exploit the region by maintaining it in a state of controlled instability?

Everyone is, to some extent, being drawn toward a shared space of integration. I believe the eight-point agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the central government in Syria is extremely valuable. It can be updated, of course, but above all, the greatest guarantee against massacres, particularly those carried out against the Alawite (Nusayri) community, is the constitutional protection of Syria’s pluralistic social fabric.

Ultimately, the defining trait of all nationalist movements is their effort to homogenize heterogeneous geographies. You cannot build an alternative for the post-Assad era by replicating Assad’s policies. Assad experienced a form of political and social collapse precisely because his policies alienated his own people. Another version of that same collapse cannot be the future of the Middle East.

Therefore, it is likely that a renewed political landscape will emerge, one that acknowledges the unique cultural realities of Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. And on a global scale, we do not see any actor categorically opposing this direction.

But the difficult part of your question lies here: predicting the future like Rasputin or Nostradamus is nearly impossible. International relations are often built on assumptions about continuity, assuming that today’s actors and conditions will remain stable. But the world doesn’t work that way.

We are dealing with a global structure where we cannot predict what someone like Donald Trump might do tomorrow. At the same time, we are in a transition period where bureaucratic governance is shrinking, corporations are gaining hegemonic influence, and representative democracy is facing a legitimacy crisis. So to say, ‘This is what will happen,’ would only replicate the deterministic logic of positivists, an approach to history we have long criticized for assuming a linear trajectory. History unfolds more like a knight’s move in chess, unexpected, nonlinear, and often counterintuitive.

Despite Trump’s unpredictable stance, how does his recent visit to the Middle East relate to the peace process we are discussing? What is its connection to the Syria-centered debates?

This is such a multilayered issue that it's best to focus on its core. For example, in the Ukraine crisis, Turkey was able to position itself at an optimal point between Russia and the West. Yet, on the Myanmar issue, Turkey found itself at odds with Russia.

The restructuring of the Middle East, particularly through Syria, represents a genuinely new development. If Trump manages to assume a disciplining role over Netanyahu, the situation could become significantly easier to navigate. But we also cannot predict how a post-Netanyahu era might unfold.

You might see actors that appear deeply opposed to one another, such as Israel, Turkey, the United States, and even Iran, come to a point of agreement on minimum common ground. International politics is not a space ruled by maximalist policies. So, through all these negotiations and compromises, a convergence point will likely emerge.

But fundamentally, we know that any solution imposed in the absence of the region’s peoples, without their participation and against their will, cannot be a lasting solution. Alexander Tocqueville once made a striking observation about the United States: ‘In America, temporary interests are permanent interests.’

We see this today. One day there is a statement about Gaza, and the next day it is reversed. At the same time, recent polls show that Trump’s approval ratings have dropped to the forties.

All of this tells us that we must move forward by recognizing the complexity and volatility of the current picture. We must proceed step by step. It is truly difficult to make long-term projections under these conditions.

What can you say about the US policy toward Syria?

If we consider how the so-called 'red lines' in Iraq, particularly those concerning the Barzani administration, eventually softened into 'pink lines,' then a similar outcome could unfold in Syria. If a consensus is reached whereby border security is managed by the central Syrian government, and the SDF are integrated into that structure, we could see a normalization of relations between Turkey and Syria.

That seems to be the direction things are heading, and I do not believe there are major obstacles. Some in Turkey claim that the Damascus, SDF agreement is happening in defiance of Turkey. But we know that is not accurate.

In this respect as well, the most difficult phase may already be behind us. If the Netanyahu administration can be dissuaded from its unprecedented policy of repeatedly bombing Syria, particularly Damascus, something even Israel did not pursue during the height of the Assad era, then we may quickly see a process of normalization in that region too, and a political reconstruction of Syria’s future can begin.

All of this shows just how deeply interconnected the developments in Turkey and Syria are and how much they influence and trigger one another.