Papers released under the 30-year rule reveal a prime minister refusing

to deal with the substance of the Irish prison protests, writes Sinn

Fein president Gerry Adams TD.

On Friday the British government released papers under the 30-year rule

that deal with the conflict in Ireland and in particular, the 1981

hunger strikes. There are hundreds of documents. Some are minutes of

meetings involving Margaret Thatcher.

I have read some but not all of the papers. Academics, historians and

journalists will be poring over the detail of these for months to come

and trying to fit the story they tell into what is already known. They

deserve the closest scrutiny.

There is of course the important health warning. These are government

documents, written in their time with the bias of those political

systems. So care is needed.

The H Block/Armagh prison protest and the hunger strikes were watershed

events in recent Irish history. Ten prisoners died. Over 50 other people

were killed during the summer of 1981, including children killed by

plastic bullets.

However, it is very clear from an initial examination of the papers that

the policy pursued by Thatcher in 1981 was inflexible, intransigent and

at crucial points duplicitous. The papers reveal a British prime

minister who consistently refuses to deal with the substance of the

prison protests.

One event which has already been the focus of some media comment is a

claim that in a meeting with the pope's envoy Fr John Magee, Bobby Sands

had offered to suspend the hunger strike for five days.

I have never heard this claim before. Moreover Bobby was very clear in

his approach to the hunger strike. The prisoners had agreed procedures

among themselves to ensure there would be no repeat of the events of the

previous December when the first hunger strike ended.

The prisoners wanted Brendan McFarlane, officer commanding in the H

Blocks, and someone from outside to be part of any discussions about any

British government proposals. This was to protect the hunger strikers

and the protest. Several days before Magee's visit Bobby had refused to

meet two members of the European Commission of Human Rights without

Brendan McFarlane being present.

Bobby viewed Magee's visit as pastoral. In none of his subsequent

conversations with either Jim Gibney or messages to McFarlane did he

mention making any offer to Magee. For him to have made such an offer

and not mention it would have been totally out of character because

Bobby diligently reported any developments. In my view he certainly

would have mentioned such an important proposal.

However, whatever the veracity of the Magee claim the British response

is clear. According to the record of the meeting between Humphrey Atkins

(the British secretary of state) and Magee, which were held at 12.30pm.

in Stormont Castle on 29 April – 7 days before Bobby died – Atkins told

Magee: "that there could be no negotiation: that was what Sands was

trying to initiate. The government had no intention of conceding

political status … To concede that would be wrong … At the end of the

meeting the SoS explained, and Father Magee accepted, that the SoS could

not see Father Magee again because to do so would risk creating the

impression that some form of negotiation was going on. There was no

question of negotiation and the SoS would not to continue to make that

quite clear."

The other aspect of this period that will be of interest to many is the

detail provided by the British of their engagement with and abuse of the

"back-channel". This was a line of communication between a Derry based

contact – Brendan Duddy – and a British intelligence agent Michael

Oatley who had direct access to Thatcher in Downing Street.

There are transcripts of eight telephone calls over the weekend of 4

July between the British agent and the Derry "back-channel" who was

given the code-name "Soon". This was just before the death of hunger

striker Joe McDonnell.

The papers raise serious questions about the relationship between London

and Soon.

For example, according to the British papers Soon had an agreed code

word with them. The paper says: "At the outset Soon indicated by a

prearranged code that he was accompanied by a representative of the

Provisionals. He had previously suggested that in this situation we

should adopt a hard line … "

These and other inconsistencies in these records only confirm me in my

view that in negotiations "facilitators" or "intermediaries" can

unintentionally or deliberately create problems by not relaying messages

accurately.

The hunger strike and its repercussions on individuals, families and the

political life of this island were far reaching. The papers that have

been released provide another insight to a tumultuous period.