Öztürk Türkdoğan, Deputy Co-Chair of the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), stated that what matters most during the stage of negative peace is to take steps that ensure the disarmament process is completed safely and with legal guarantees. He said: “I believe that instead of focusing on various expectations, it would be more appropriate to expand the struggle and ensure that concrete steps are taken.”

Öztürk Türkdoğan, Deputy Co-Chair of the DEM Party responsible for the Commission on Law and Human Rights, responded to ANF's questions regarding the 10th Judicial Package submitted to parliament by the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The legal steps promised by the government had created public expectation. How much did the 10th Judicial Package meet those expectations?

After the Call for Peace and a Democratic Society, the process proceeded with the knowledge and guidance of Abdullah Öcalan. This is one of the defining aspects of the current phase. The process reached a certain stage following the PKK’s congress and its decision to disarm. At precisely this point, we made certain demands of the government: first, to strengthen our people’s trust in the process, and second, to put an end to harmful practices that have caused deep wounds in the public and societal conscience.

What were those demands?

These demands concerned the situation of ill prisoners and various inequalities related to the execution of sentences, and problems arising directly from the enforcement system. We raised these issues mainly to strengthen the public’s trust in the process and to address the deep and accumulated injustices of the past. Let me emphasize that these demands are not transactional in nature, not part of a give-and-take dynamic tied to a particular phase of the process. On the contrary, we have brought forward all the fundamental issues in a principled manner.

How do you interpret the failure to meet expectations?

The expectations were also about increasing public support for the process. Our people, especially the Kurdish people, place full trust in Mr. Öcalan, but there is a deep distrust towards the government. The practices of the ruling power over the past ten years have created serious mistrust. It was at exactly this point that these issues came to the fore, and a meaningful opportunity for dialogue emerged. During this period, we were able to negotiate certain issues. Our colleagues held detailed discussions not only with the ministry and officials from the AKP but also with other opposition parties within the parliamentary setting. I find this alone to be significant, because until now, such a situation has not occurred. At this stage, the execution package, that is, the 10th Judicial Package, was about to be submitted to parliament. We first demanded that items unrelated to the execution of sentences not be included in the package. This was accepted, and some issues were left out. Our core demand regarding sentencing was the elimination of inequality in the execution of sentences. As you know, for those convicted under the Anti-Terror Law, the conditional release period is set at three-quarters of the sentence. This is an extremely high threshold. We demanded that this be equalized with other categories of prisoners. This demand was accepted.

This also brings with it a criticism of inequality in sentencing, correct?

Of course. Turkey is currently facing serious structural problems. One of the main issues is that no distinction is made between those who resort to violence and those who do not. As a result, the Anti-Terror Law is applied indiscriminately to everyone. It doesn’t matter if you are a journalist, politician, intellectual, writer, or lawyer, the same legal provisions are applied to them as to those who take up arms or engage in armed actions. In such a context, of course, we will use the term “political prisoner,” because that is exactly what they are: political individuals and political detainees. We clearly stated that a step needed to be taken on this matter, but what we’re seeing is the opposite. For example, the conditional release period for someone convicted of theft is one-half of their sentence. But if a journalist writes an article critical of the government and is convicted, their conditional release period is three-quarters. This absurdity must be corrected. But it hasn’t been and has instead been postponed.

Don’t the Administrative and Observation Boards also create problems?

Look, you serve three-quarters of your sentence. Just when you’re about to be released, a new board appears in front of you. This board evaluates you and says, “You didn’t meet the evaluation criteria. I’ll assess you again in 3, 6, or 9 months.” This is an administrative board, and even though your conditional release period has ended, it extends your time and effectively makes you serve your entire sentence, nearly four-quarters. We said this should be removed. These are administrative bodies exercising judicial authority, which is unconstitutional. And on top of that, they ask political prisoners, “Are you remorseful?” But that question is already addressed during the trial phase by the court. These individuals are sentenced precisely because they are not remorseful for their political beliefs. There are people who have already served 30 years in prison and are still being held, 31, 32, 33, even 34 years. This is unacceptable. Yet they postponed changes to this regulation as well.

What about the regulation on the release of ill prisoners?

We demanded that the path to the release of ill prisoners be opened and that the entire system surrounding this issue be restructured. In particular, we called for a review of the rigid practices of the Forensic Medicine Institute and for a broader perspective to be adopted. We proposed that health reports issued by hospitals affiliated with the Ministry of Health or by university hospitals should be sufficient for prosecutors to make release decisions. These proposals were rejected. The only step that was taken is found under what we refer to as the “special execution procedure,” outlined in Article 110. According to Article 16 of the execution law, if a prisoner suffers from a severe illness or disability that prevents them from continuing their life alone in prison, and if they are not considered a threat to public safety, the remaining sentence may be served under house arrest by decision of the sentence enforcement judge. This is a step forward. We consider this part of the package to be positive. However, individuals sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment have been excluded from this provision.

Wasn’t the release of ill prisoners already possible with a report from the Forensic Medicine Institute?

Article 16 already included such a provision, but the current amendment introduces a more facilitating procedure. Now, the sentence enforcement judge will make the decision, and the remaining sentence can be served under house arrest.

Will a report from the Forensic Medicine Institute no longer be required?

A report from the Forensic Medicine Institute will still be requested, but in practice, the individual may not have to be physically taken there. Health reports from hospitals can also be reviewed based on documentation alone. In fact, this is already possible under Article 16. We expect this amendment to correct some of the problems in implementation. We are waiting for a concrete step to be taken on this matter. The government has recently been appointing large numbers of personnel to the Forensic Medicine Institute, which itself has long been part of the problem.

There have been criticisms that the Forensic Medicine Institute has become politicized. Reports stating that severely ill prisoners were “fit to remain in prison” caused serious harm. Will these injustices be resolved?

The implementation of this article will be defined through a change in regulation. A similar provision already existed, but since a special execution procedure is now being introduced, its details will be regulated separately. We can consider this a step forward, as there were clear cases of discrimination, especially in the context of special execution procedures. Notably, the phrase “within the scope of the Anti-Terror Law” was removed from this article. However, individuals sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment were still excluded. So yes, this can be seen as a small step, but how it unfolds will largely depend on its application in practice.

If discretion lies with the sentence enforcement judge, could they issue politically motivated decisions that appear legal, such as blocking the release of a paralyzed prisoner by claiming they are “a threat to society”?

That is possible. However, the decisions of the sentence enforcement judge are subject to appeal before the high criminal court. So there is a legal path available. Here’s how we should think about it: if the government, as the legislative authority, introduces a provision that facilitates the release of ill prisoners, then those tasked with implementation must act in line with the will of the legislature. In that sense, we will say to the government: “If you have taken a positive step, then you must not allow elements in the implementation process to create negative consequences.” This is the natural order of things. If you make a move in favor of rights, then you are obligated to follow through. All of this is an optimistic interpretation. If the law is passed in its current form, the relevant regulations or implementation directives will follow shortly after. We will observe how it is applied in practice and only then will we be able to speak more concretely.

Aggravated life imprisonment has long been debated as a form of law tailored to individuals. Its continued exclusion from reforms is once again being called an aberration. How do you assess this?

It’s very clear from this that the government is still not prepared for this new phase, particularly in regard to Mr. Öcalan. As you know, we agreed, with Mr. Öcalan’s knowledge, to postpone discussions about the “Right to Hope” to a later stage. But in a country that has abolished the death penalty, there should no longer be a legal concept such as aggravated life imprisonment. There must not be a practice of “execution until death.” The rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) are clear on this matter. There are also numerous ECHR decisions concerning the release of ill prisoners. This issue, too, has been postponed. In reality, aggravated life imprisonment holds Turkey’s entire sentencing regime hostage. When you design the heaviest punishment in the harshest way, you inevitably shape all other sentences in relation to it. If we are to seriously discuss the abolition of aggravated life imprisonment, it will necessitate a comprehensive reform of the sentencing regime. This is a fundamental issue, not something that applies only to Mr. Öcalan. Thousands of people are affected negatively under this system through his case. In fact, the entire execution regime is affected. That’s why we consider this a core issue. We will absolutely continue to negotiate and discuss this. As the process progresses, this topic will naturally become part of our agenda. If we are to carry out a genuine reform, it must begin with abolishing aggravated life imprisonment.

Until this judicial package was introduced, the government hadn’t taken any legal steps. Would you say a step has now been taken, or is it more of a symbolic gesture?

In my view, the 10th Judicial Package was already in the government’s plans. It shouldn’t be seen as something new. There was a provision related to COVID. But when political prisoners were excluded from that scope, it was completely dropped. The issue was postponed to a later time, despite the severe injustice it involved. So I believe we need to focus more seriously on the legal infrastructure of the process, its legal guarantees. For example, the parliamentary commission that should be established by law can be considered within this framework. Similarly, various legal safeguards concerning the disarmament process should also be addressed in this context. Of course, as the process progresses, we will need a comprehensive framework of law. In fact, Turkey passed such a law in 2014, Law No. 6551, but after the process was interrupted in 2015, it was never implemented. That law is still in force. However, the institution responsible for its secretariat was dismantled, and now all authority lies with the Presidency. If we are going to discuss the legal requirements of the process, we must start with the establishment of the parliamentary commission as envisioned. We can also begin to discuss what other laws might be put on the agenda. Topics like the execution regime, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association, and the right to political participation will have to be addressed as part of broader democratization reforms as the process evolves. Right now, we are in a stage of negative peace. Once negative peace is achieved, we must move into a phase of positive peace, and alongside that, a phase of democratization. That is when we can talk about comprehensive reforms. At this stage of negative peace, what matters most is taking legal steps that ensure the disarmament process can be carried out safely and with legal guarantees. These are necessary. You must establish how thousands of people will lay down their weapons and then how they will rejoin public life, political life, and social life. That’s how this should be approached.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Deputy Chair Feti Yıldız stated that the dimension of the process related to resolution would be addressed in September or October. Some interpret this as a way of keeping public expectations alive, while others see it as a stalling tactic. How do you view these statements?

I believe it would be more constructive to approach the matter as follows: this process will undoubtedly move forward through mutual steps. Therefore, I do not think it is helpful to be prejudiced or dismissive from the outset. We will continue to emphasize the necessary conditions and insist that legal and political steps must be taken. Our dialogue and negotiations will continue. At the same time, we will persist in discussing the expansion of Mr. Öcalan’s working conditions and the steps needed to ensure that he is placed in a position where he can guide and manage the process. This is how the process will advance, and I believe expressing it in this way is more appropriate. Another essential aspect of this process is ensuring that Mr. Öcalan is better informed about everything taking place and that discussions on these matters be conducted through consultation with him. In fact, Mr. Öcalan himself requested the establishment of a parliamentary commission in the messages he sent to political parties in December. Our delegation has repeatedly voiced this demand since then. Now, I believe it is important for Mr. Bahçeli to take the initiative on the formation of the parliamentary commission, and for the Speaker of Parliament to begin visiting political parties. Hopefully, before parliament goes into recess, a parliamentary commission will be established by law. I believe the commission's work over the next few months, especially in areas such as observation, the socialization of peace, and necessary legal reforms, will be of great significance.

Do you have a concrete timeline ahead? The main package has been postponed to September, but is there a roadmap regarding the steps to be taken?

As far as I understand, there is no concrete timeline at the moment. However, the current phase of the disarmament process will be taken into account. Once the disarmament phase is completed, we will need to be in a position to discuss much more advanced and comprehensive matters.

One of the concerns in society is exactly this: steps are constantly being taken from one side only, while people are told that ‘more advanced and important things will be discussed later.’ What needs to be done to address this concern?

I believe we must continue to have confidence in ourselves and in Mr. Öcalan. As emphasized in the Call for Peace and a Democratic Society, our people must organize themselves, pursue political struggle, and develop new forms of organization. We need to trust in ourselves. After all, our people have reached a certain level of political maturity. Therefore, rather than relying on expectations, I believe it would be more appropriate to expand the struggle and ensure that the necessary steps are taken through that effort. Let us not forget, Mr. Öcalan took this initiative entirely on his own. It was a major initiative. And now, he is continuing it. If we view it from this perspective, I believe we will be able to carry all of this forward step by step. Of course, we will have to push hard on many fronts. For example, in this judicial package, there was no new regulation regarding Articles 220/6 and 314/3 of the Penal Code. These absurd charges, framed as “aiding a terrorist organization,” have been used for years to persecute thousands of people. Now, that offense is finally being eliminated. Even if small, this is a gain and it should be acknowledged. As we already said from the beginning, public expectations are very high. But we are still in the phase of negative peace. Once we bring that phase to a conclusion, we will enter a new period in which we can begin to address much more comprehensive issues.