Political scientist Mehmet Zahir Sarıtaş evaluated the disbanding of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Abdullah Öcalan’s call for a new social contract in Turkish-Kurdish relations. He emphasized that, in light of the ongoing constitutional debates in Turkey, resolving the Kurdish question on the basis of equal citizenship is of critical importance. According to Sarıtaş, this resolution must involve concrete steps in areas such as education in the mother tongue, cultural rights, political representation, and status.

Sarıtaş underlined that, amid the reshaping of power balances in the Middle East, particularly under the shadow of the conflict between Iran and Israel, solving the Kurdish question on these foundations holds vital significance for Turkey.

How do you evaluate the developments following the PKK's decision to disband and Abdullah Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society” in the historical context of the Kurdish question, considering Turkey’s internal politics and regional dynamics?

From a historical perspective, the Kurdish question spans more than two centuries, dating back to the first uprisings and continuing to the present day. In the 102-year history of the Republic, the issue has steadily intensified. Policies of annihilation, denial, repression, assimilation, and rejection have been continuously updated through various methods. This has transformed the issue into an existential threat within the historical and social reality of the Kurdish people, raising the danger of their erasure from history.

Abdullah Öcalan has repeatedly emphasized that the emergence of the PKK is rooted in precisely this reality. Indeed, many intellectuals, writers, historians, and academics concerned with the Kurdish question argue that the existence of the PKK is not the cause of the issue but rather a consequence of the problem itself and its unresolved nature. This assessment is significant and closely aligned with the perspective of Mr. Öcalan.

The general approach of the state, however, has been to reject these assessments, opting instead for policies of suppression and intimidation. This stance has only deepened the problem, elevating it to a regional and global scale and leaving deep historical and social wounds. These consequences are not limited to the Kurdish people, they affect all of Turkish society. Returning to your question: the PKK’s decision to disband was a move taken with the initiative and responsibility of Mr. Öcalan. The PKK expressed its agreement with this decision, first declaring a ceasefire and then holding its 12th congress between May 5 and 7, during which it officially adopted Mr. Öcalan’s broad perspective and announced its disbandment. This decision was made public on May 12. Mr. Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society,” along with the PKK’s decision to disband, generated significant global resonance. Heads of state, intellectuals, and institutions such as the United Nations welcomed it as a major and positive step. In Turkey as well, the decision was largely received positively by the public, political parties, and civil society organizations. It is crucial to emphasize that this decision represents a historic opportunity for the Turkish state and society, for peace among the peoples of the Middle East, for resolving the Kurdish question, and for the freedom of the Kurdish people. This opportunity must be realized by considering the historical truths of societies, within a democratic framework, embraced with a sense of collective responsibility, and directed toward the benefit of all. The events that began with the Arab Spring in 2011, the civil war in Syria, Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, and most recently the outbreak of war between Iran and Israel, have once again clearly demonstrated the importance of resolving the Kurdish question. When viewed within the context of these developments, the “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society” and the PKK’s disbandment constitute a truly historic opportunity. This moment must be seen as a turning point not only for the freedom of the Kurdish people but also as a foundational step toward social peace and security in the states where Kurds live. In other words, states must create a balanced and integrated relationship between freedom, social peace, and security, each of which nourishes, complements, and inherently contains the others.

How do you see the potential of this call to advance the peace process?

The Kurdish people, having borne the heaviest costs and suffering the deepest consequences of protracted conflicts, have consistently demanded peace without ever renouncing their national rights and freedoms. Throughout these long years of struggle, Kurds placed the concept of peace at the heart of nearly every political expression, to the point that it can be said they became synonymous with the notion of peace itself. It must be acknowledged that, in the person of Mr. Öcalan, the Kurdish people have developed their freedom struggle in direct connection with democracy and peace. It is important to recall that Mr. Öcalan has a long history of calls for peace and of seeking a democratic political solution to the Kurdish question. Since 1992, he has made such appeals at various intervals, during the Özal era, in the Oslo talks, throughout the resolution process, and most recently with his “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society.” These repeated attempts at dialogue show a persistent commitment to peaceful resolution. Unfortunately, past processes were not approached with the seriousness and depth they required, and both the state and society experienced their negative consequences. Therefore, any progress in the current and still unnamed process must begin by learning from those past experiences. To move forward, both sides must demonstrate genuine commitment, mutual sensitivity, and take reciprocal steps. For the process to function in a healthy and sustainable way, Mr. Öcalan, as one of its key actors, must be provided with free and suitable working conditions. There must also be concrete solution proposals from both sides, mutual negotiations around those proposals, binding decisions on agreed issues, and a clear legal framework for those decisions. If the state, as the main political institution, including the ruling party and opposition, approaches this call with sincerity, realism, and a focus on resolution, it will become evident that there is widespread societal support. Kurdish society has clearly embraced this call and is making sincere efforts to fulfill its requirements. The state and all sectors of society must likewise approach the call with responsibility and commitment. The duty and responsibility of building a peaceful and democratic society should not rest solely on the Kurds. The state must also take on this responsibility. Only then can meaningful progress be achieved.

What does Abdullah Öcalan’s call for a new social contract signify for the redefinition of Kurdish-Turkish relations? What concrete steps should the state take in response to this call?

The notion of a social contract refers fundamentally to a new constitution. This is also how it is commonly used in political literature. Social contracts or constitutions are legal and binding texts that aim to regulate the relationship between the state, society, and the individual on the basis of freedom and equality, and in accordance with the requirements of a democratic society. A democratic and inclusive constitution is essential. It must not only prevent the grounds for societal conflicts but also provide a framework that ensures social reconciliation and enables diverse groups to coexist freely. Turkey’s constitutional history, particularly the current 1982 Constitution, has not developed within such a framework. As a result, it has continuously produced sources of conflict throughout the history of the Republic. One of the most pressing of these unresolved issues is the Kurdish question, which stems from the state's refusal to recognize the Kurdish people’s demands for identity, language, equality, and freedom. The failure to resolve this issue has severely damaged Kurdish-Turkish relations and brought them to the brink of collapse. Mr. Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society” and his emphasis on a new social contract represent a path toward repairing and reordering this damaged relationship. Since states possess the legitimate monopoly on the use of force, political power often uses this force against the interests of society. Therefore, the need for a social contract has historically developed from the necessity to protect societies and to place limits on the state. The fundamental purpose of such a contract is to secure the individual and collective rights and freedoms of societies. Through this framework, it is possible to establish a level of trust, order, and balance in state-society-individual relations, ensuring social order and peace. If the state can create a new constitution within this framework, it could eliminate many long-standing problems, including the Kurdish question. However, the steps needed to lay the groundwork for this process and those required to constitutionally secure Kurdish demands must be addressed as distinct, though related, components.

Reciprocal steps from all sides are essential for the process to progress in a healthy and constructive manner and for social consensus to develop. The most critical turning point was the PKK’s decision to disband, effectively ending the armed struggle. Following this, the state must take steps of its own to build mutual trust and ensure the process matures. So, what could these steps be? First and foremost, Mr. Öcalan, as one of the key actors in the process, must be granted free and adequate working conditions. In addition, a broadly representative commission should be established within the parliament. This commission must function effectively and work on legislative regulations that will strengthen the process. Within this scope, a comprehensive amnesty law titled “Social Peace and Democratic Society Law” should be enacted to cover all detainees and convicts. This law should include measures for the reintegration of PKK members into society. Furthermore, the policy of appointing trustees to replace elected officials must end, and dismissed co-mayors should be reinstated. Political trials must be brought to a close based on the principle of judicial independence, and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Constitutional Court must be implemented without delay. Once these steps are taken, a strong sense of public ownership and motivation will emerge. On such a foundation, it will then be possible to begin drafting a framework for resolving the issue and initiating work on a new constitution.

What are the main constitutional demands of the Kurds in the context of the new constitution debate? In your view, what rights and guarantees do Kurds need at the constitutional level for a lasting solution?

From a perspective that prioritizes social peace and a democratic society, the Kurdish identity must be explicitly recognized in the constitution. Alternatively, the definition of citizenship should be formulated in a neutral manner, such as “citizenship of Turkey”, to inclusively encompass all ethnic, religious, and cultural identities. To protect all forms of diversity, the principle of equality must be clearly defined and constitutionally guaranteed.

Kurdish should be recognized as a second official language and be guaranteed for use in public services as an official language. Additionally, the right to education in the Kurdish mother tongue must be secured from primary school through university, including the provision of master’s and doctoral programs for academic advancement.

Freedoms of thought, expression, belief, press, and association must be guaranteed and protected.

A framework for public administration and local governance must be defined and secured based on a model of decentralization that expands the authority of local governments and advances local democracy. Recognizing the political status of the Kurdish people is a fundamental guarantee for resolving the Kurdish question. There are different models through which this can be achieved, federalism, autonomy, or decentralization. Any one of these frameworks could be adopted. There is often a misconception regarding these concepts in Turkey. They are frequently associated with division and viewed negatively. In reality, however, democratic states see local democracy and such governance models as means of addressing and resolving issues. Within Turkey’s own unique context, resolving the Kurdish issue through one of these models would not weaken the state, it would strengthen it by establishing lasting peace.

How do recent political developments in the Middle East, particularly the Israel-Iran war, affect the resolution process of the Kurdish question in Turkey? How do you evaluate this situation?

There is increasing debate that the United States and other Western powers are attempting to reshape the global system and power dynamics to serve their own interests, aiming to eliminate the chaotic uncertainty that followed the Cold War. As part of this goal, the intention to redesign the Middle East has become increasingly apparent, something that can be clearly observed through the policies implemented since the September 11 attacks.

This effort to redesign the Middle East bears striking similarities to the process that unfolded during the First World War. These parallels offer serious lessons for all states and societies in the region. Prior to World War I, nearly the entire Middle East was under Ottoman control. When the Ottoman Empire was defeated during the war, these lands were divided and occupied by the victors, namely Britain and France, through the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. With the end of the war, the Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkey as a nation-state, while most of the former Ottoman lands remained under British and French control. The Arab states and the borders of Turkey were later drawn by these powers in ways that served their own strategic interests. This imposed system has been a fundamental source of instability in the Middle East for the past 100 years. In reality, the states established in the region were not founded solely through national liberation struggles. Rather, they were formed within the framework of British and French interests and with their approval. If Britain and France, despite being fragmented within Europe and lacking the hegemonic influence the United States holds today, could redesign the region a century ago, then today’s much stronger Western powers can surely attempt it again. The states of the region, lacking sufficient strength, are unable to effectively resist or deter these efforts led by the United States and its allies. This creates serious risks and uncertainties for all regional states. It is unclear where such interventions will lead. From Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, and Gaza to the latest developments in Iran, all point to a broader effort to reshape the region. Whether Turkey, a NATO member that has distanced itself from Western powers since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and instead aligned with Russia and Iran through the Astana process, will also be targeted remains uncertain. Notably, Devlet Bahçeli has suggested that the real target of intervention in Iran may in fact be Turkey, thus acknowledging the possibility of such a scenario.

The objective of this Middle East reconfiguration seems to be to recreate global systems and balances of power in favor of Western powers led by the United States. This includes paving the way for a new world order, securing new energy corridors, ensuring Israel’s security, and aligning regional states and societies with these aims. Within this context, the Kurdish region, Kurdistan, is assigned significant geopolitical and strategic value, and the Kurds are increasingly seen as strategic allies. The United States has repeatedly referred to the Kurds, particularly in Rojava, as “strategic partners” in official statements. France has made similar declarations. All of these developments and interventions have made Kurdish demands for freedom and rights more visible and have strengthened the ground for securing political status. The U.S. intervention in Iraq led to Kurdish autonomy. In Syria, Kurds are also very close to achieving political status, indeed, a resolution that does not include Kurdish status now seems almost impossible. After a potential intervention in Iran, it is also likely that the Kurds there could gain political status. In each of these three states, Kurdish issues, along with other deep-rooted problems, remain unresolved because democratic systems have not been established. As a result, these countries have remained vulnerable to external intervention.

Turkey must interpret all these developments correctly and move away from its past approaches. It must resolve its own Kurdish question through democratic means, adopt a new democratic constitution, and recognize the political status of the Kurds within a framework of historical and strategic partnership. This approach should extend to all Kurdish populations. Doing so would not only make both Turkey and the Kurds more democratic and free, it would also make them stronger. In my view, the Turkish state, recognizing the risks emerging from these developments, has initiated this process through Devlet Bahçeli with a sensitivity toward state continuity. Mr. Abdullah Öcalan has long foreseen these developments in the Middle East and has offered democratic solutions accordingly. As someone with a deep understanding of the region, he chose to respond positively with his "Call for Peace and a Democratic Society," seeking to resolve the issue within Turkey. This must be viewed as a historic opportunity. If the state and the Kurds can resolve the issue among themselves through rational, realistic means, free of political posturing, Turkey will no longer be vulnerable to external interventions or face existential threats, and it will become a strong regional actor. At the same time, the Kurdish people will gain political status and freedom.

Had Mr. Öcalan’s proposals, developed within his paradigm of democratic modernity, including concepts such as the democratic nation, democratic confederalism, and a democratic Middle East confederation, been taken seriously, we might today be discussing a very different Middle East. Many of these interventions could have been prevented.