ANF spoke with Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Honorary Chairperson of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), about the new phase initiated by Abdullah Öcalan’s call and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) decision to end armed struggle. The discussion also covered the government’s and the state’s approach to the process, how it is being presented to the public, developments regarding a resolution to the Kurdish question, and ongoing debates over the new constitution.

At its most recent congress, the PKK declared the end of armed struggle and adopted radical decisions to open the door to a new process. However, instead of activating mechanisms that could reinforce this shift, the state has been presenting the matter to the public solely through the lens of a “Turkey without terrorism” narrative. Doesn’t this approach reduce the scope of a solution to a narrow framework of security?

Of course, this is absolutely the case. The government is pursuing a process in which the status quo will change as little, as slowly, and as late as possible. A step that could be taken in an hour ends up taking a month. The regime drags its feet. Even if Bahçeli and Erdoğan ultimately converge at a common point, it is clear they operate according to different parameters.

Bahçeli sees the absence of conflict as part of building a corporatist state, whereas Erdoğan’s primary concern is not a democratic and political solution to the Kurdish question. What matters to him is maintaining a unified power structure centered on the military-industrial complex and preserving political rule as a dynastic hegemony. For Erdoğan, any potential step on the Kurdish question, whether it will be taken, when, and how, is evaluated solely in terms of electoral return or whether it can serve as a tourniquet for bleeding support.

Erdoğan has achieved this before by insisting on “non-solution.” Although he could not defeat the PKK through the so-called “Collapse Operation,” he experienced how the security-based strategy centered around this operation could consolidate his power and his regime reaped immense gains from it. It is impossible for those in power to give up the comfort that has become embedded in their very bones.

Moreover, all political simulations suggest that this new “opening” will continue to cost the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has shouldered the main burden of this process in front of the nationalist base, until the next election. Even if the Justice and Development Party (AKP) regains a few points through its open confrontation with the Republican People’s Party (CHP), MHP continues to decline. All scenarios indicate that unless a miracle occurs, the People’s Alliance will not be able to secure the 360 or 400 seats needed to change the constitution, nor will it be able to generate any new power dynamic from this move to reinforce or maintain control.

That is why the regime’s reflexes will become even more conditional, with every potential step now subject to whether it serves the function of preserving power. The narrative of a “Turkey without terrorism” is already focused on the pre-acceptance of this framework.

Like all slogans that draw their strength from the past rather than the future, this formulation does not aim to serve the rights of the Kurds. Rather, it seeks to legitimize domination, with all its implications and depends entirely on whether it can manufacture public consent for Erdoğan and his dynasty’s rise from the “Collapse Operation” to “eternal rule.”

A parliamentary commission is being discussed to manage the process. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and Speaker of Parliament Numan Kurtulmuş have both called for such a body. In your view, do these calls reflect a genuine will for resolution, or are they a way for the ruling power to stretch the issue over time and manage it?

Under the current regime architecture, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) ranks below the President in the hierarchy of power. With the legal amendments passed in the General Assembly this week, the Parliament continues to transfer its authority to the President. In the end, TBMM is neither authorized nor obliged to “manage a process.” It is worth remembering that what is called the “Presidential Government System” was invented precisely so that the Palace would not have to share executive power with anyone.

Moreover, even if the Parliament ends up doing nothing more than talking, the AKP and MHP alliance already holds the absolute majority needed to shape that discourse. Bahçeli proposed that the “Strategy for a Terror-Free Turkey in the New Century; Commission for National Unity and Solidarity,” which he suggested be chaired by Kurtulmuş, should make decisions by absolute majority. Although Bahçeli envisions the commission having 100 members representing all 16 parties in the Parliament, ensuring at least one representative from each party and proportional representation for those with parliamentary groups, these structural inclusions do not change the fact that the commission, due to majority-based decision-making, would function as an “inner parliament” aligned with the Palace’s directives.

That said, if the commission begins its work, it may serve a dual function: it could become a platform for engagement by social opposition groups, the Kurdish people, and other stakeholders in the resolution process. But the parties of dictatorship will use this stage to push a narrative rooted in ultra-nationalist fantasies and vengeance-driven rhetoric, aiming to delegitimize genuine resolution efforts and block any meaningful structural change.

In contrast, democratic, pro-freedom, and anti-dictatorship forces could utilize this platform as a podium to speak beyond the walls of the Parliament and into society. It could become a space where the security-based arguments of the regime are dismantled and where calls for a democratic and social republic echo.

Bahçeli’s intention in proposing this idea is not truly to create a body for negotiation and resolution, but rather to construct a stage for political theater. This space is needed to show the nationalist base of the regime that the political void left by the PKK’s disarmament and self-dissolution is not being filled by Kurdish political representatives and thus there is no reason for them to feel defeated.

In this way, the regime hopes to create the impression that all political actors, including the representatives of the Kurds, are converging around the ruling structure. This would help spread a sense of “national unity and togetherness,” relieving pressure on the regime. In short, the proposal is not just a show of appearances, but it is also not intended to be a genuine “negotiation table” between Kurds and Turks.

Nonetheless, democratic and social opposition dynamics within the Parliament, especially the DEM Party, can still use this commission to open a window for real dialogue with society. The main challenge is for the DEM Party to create communication channels that reach beyond the Parliament and connect with the broader public, developing a field of action and discourse outside the pro-government and mainstream media.

If such a parliamentary commission is to be formed, then aside from those directly involved in its work, the entire DEM Party group and its local branches should focus on building a narrative that brings what is happening to the public in their own terms, reframing it within ongoing social and political struggles.

Based on public opinion surveys, our own political experience, and the reflections of our activism, we see that economic issues are the top priority shaping society’s political behavior, followed by justice and the rule of law, and unemployment. Security (conflict/non-conflict) and the Kurdish issue enter the public political agenda only after this.

For all these reasons, it is not possible to speak of a real resolution to the conflict gaining social legitimacy within the boundaries of Bahçeli’s proposed “Commission for National Unity and Solidarity.” Still, for the reasons I mentioned earlier, even this platform is better than nothing. It could also enable the Grand National Assembly of Turkey itself to move toward a common ground, rather than the DEM Party having to go from party to party. This may help generate a new synergy within the process.

As the new constitution debates continue, why is Abdullah Öcalan’s call for a new “social contract” that redefines the relationship between Kurds and Turks being ignored? Can a “new constitution” truly be new without addressing the Kurdish question at a constitutional level?

In my view, there is no rational reason for Kurds, democrats, socialists, and representatives of the oppressed classes and peoples to be anxious about a “new constitution.” Given the current political power balance, it is about as likely that the parties dominating the TBMM and the presidency would contribute to a democratic constitution, without being pressured from society or forced to do so, as it is for a ‘‘tiger to become vegetarian.’’

How credible is it to assume that those who have publicly declared they will not implement Constitutional Court rulings, and who continue their “collapse” operation against the Istanbul Metropolitan and district municipalities, would pursue a constitution that opens the way for self-governance in Kurdish regions?

Moreover, how can anyone claim that such a constitution could be negotiated in a Parliament where all essential references for a democratic definition of citizenship, one that does not rely on religion, language, or ethnicity, have already been banned by the parliamentary Rules of Procedure?

As clearly stated in Article 161, Paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure, it is forbidden in the TBMM to “insult or curse the history and common past of the Turkish nation, the constitutional order defined in the first four articles of the Constitution, or make definitions that contradict the administrative structure based on the indivisible integrity of the country and the nation.”

Under the most restrictive interpretation of “insult” in a dictatorial context, where referring to the current regime as a “dictatorship,” acknowledging the Armenian genocide of 1915–18, referencing massacres of Kurds between 1921 and 1937, or suggesting that Turkey’s administrative structure must be changed based on collective rights are all effectively prohibited, can indulging in such constitutional dreams be anything more than self-deception?

Of course, if one is willing to pay the price, it is still possible to express all of this from the parliamentary rostrum. And naturally, the democratic, revolutionary, and socialist forces in Parliament can discuss how to use such opportunities to push for a Parliament free from prohibitions. However, both the language of the TBMM and the society could, in fact, address all of this not through constitutional amendments but through a series of laws that could be passed tomorrow with a simple majority. All assumptions about the future of Turkey and Kurdistan could be debated thoroughly and openly, and the social agenda could be clarified.

A proposal for a “civil” new constitution, introduced without lifting a finger for what could be done immediately, such as initiating improvements that could free seriously ill prisoners, reveals that its proponents are not aiming for a genuine resolution. Instead, it shows their actual goal is to adjust the constitutional articles on presidential elections to better match polling results.

If the intention is truly to draft a “civil” constitution, then begin by fulfilling the commitments undertaken when re-engaging with the Council of Europe: introduce legal reforms to enhance freedom of expression and association, improve the treatment of detainees, and ensure the protection of Kurdish cultural rights. Implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

In this context, it is not difficult to understand why Abdullah Öcalan’s proposal for a “social contract” to resolve the Kurdish question and the many constitutional amendment proposals submitted to Parliament since the days of the Democracy Party (DEP), are being ignored. Still, as I said, even if this commission is established for other purposes, I trust that the deputies we sent to Parliament will begin by breaking down the barriers to freedom of expression and raise the peoples’ demands using the concepts and terms that those who elected them wish to hear.

Can the CHP and other opposition parties develop a strong and democratic stance in the constitutional debate? Has the opposition managed to go beyond the state’s boundaries on the Kurdish issue, or can they? Under these circumstances, what political strategy should the DEM Party and other progressive forces adopt?

I see that the CHP is engaged in an extremely difficult struggle under intense pressure, and it is standing firm with determination. This struggle is transforming the party, its leadership, members, and base, in many ways: from language and discourse to attitude and political posture. Since the coup attempt against the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on March 19, the CHP has been undergoing a deep transformation. And it is not a one-dimensional process. While the majority are resisting, growing stronger, and maintaining dialogue with other sectors of the opposition as they confront the regime, there are also those seeking engagement with the dictatorship and those who have changed sides.

But I observe a growing current within the CHP that is pushing for a renewed founding of the Republic, this time inclusive of the rights of Kurds and Alevis. The Kurdish people are watching this development with attention and interest. As CHP members experience state repression in the heart of Istanbul, I believe they are beginning to better understand how Kurds have silently endured far greater suffering in remote regions for the past forty years. Now is the time for solidarity. No one should be subjected to this. No one should be allowed to suffer such injustice.

Expecting a political tradition rooted in nearly a century of ideas, habits, and conventions to change fundamentally overnight would be unrealistic. The democratic and social forces of Turkey and Kurdistan did not emerge from modern socialist or social democratic traditions. The modern Turkish state was built within a political framework where the state was everything and society was nothing. Yet as politics approached society through the guise of the state, society responded from the countryside to the cities, from slums to political parties and unions, carrying with it the rebellious, democratic traditions shaped over millennia in Anatolia and Mesopotamia.

Within this flow, the CHP continues to undergo a metamorphosis. This “Anatolian rebellion” serves as a kind of vaccine from below, blended with the lessons of global social struggles from above and shaped by the human resources at hand. This transformation must be given a chance, because the CHP is facing an existential challenge. Just as the dictatorship continues its assault without forfeiting any of the domination it has accumulated since the time of Nizamülmülk, those facing this challenge can only overcome it by bringing together all the historical, local, and global knowledge and culture of resistance and rebellion. They will be the ones to do it. But if they lose, everyone will lose. So, this is not a struggle we can afford to watch from the sidelines.

Today, we may not have highly structured political organizations under the uninterrupted coups we’ve lived through since 12 September 1980, but we do have a powerful revolutionary culture fed by the legacy of rebellion, and strong traditions of social struggle and solidarity. The PKK decision to dissolve itself and abandon armed struggle has, in fact, opened the way for the revolutionary energy of the Kurdish people to flow more freely.

We must reckon with the past ten years

The truth is, if Turkey and Kurdistan have not succumbed to fascism over the past decade, if opposition has managed to persist, we owe it entirely to the tactical trench warfare developed through the historical experience, knowledge, and determination of the Kurdish people and the social and democratic opposition dynamics in Turkey. It is also thanks to their ability to seek out and find allies, and to engage in joint struggle through unifying language and actions.

We can say with full confidence that the civilian and socio-political arm of the “Collapse Operation” was ultimately neutralized by the political persistence of the peoples, through their own experience, collective wisdom, and patient insistence.

Above all, we must undertake a reckoning of the past ten years. We need to properly analyze the “flexible response” tactics adopted by Kurdish and Turkish workers in the metropoles during every critical regime assault and attempt to suppress dissent. While political agreements between organized forces are important, we must also create pathways for grassroots alliances and solidarity among communities.

Even if the peoples did not directly engage the dictatorship in a pitched battle, we must learn from their refusal to be seduced or deceived by it.

Today, the most pressing issue is to prevent the state of non-conflict from becoming an opportunity for the dictatorship to escalate, and instead to open the way for an alliance of social and democratic opposition forces toward a truly “terror-free state.”