The Turkish state has approached negotiation processes solely through the lens of its own interests, refusing to pursue a sincere democratic resolution beyond policies of denial and annihilation. Last month, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) once again declared a ceasefire, reaffirming its commitment to peace and a democratic solution.

The PKK announced the ceasefire after Abdullah Öcalan’s statement titled 'Call for Peace and a Democratic Society' was shared on 27 February. Despite this, Turkish state attacks on guerrilla areas have continued. The parliament has yet to take any steps, and no legal or political groundwork has been established. Every attempt at dialogue between the PKK and the Turkish state, despite the persistent efforts of Mr. Öcalan and the PKK, has been brought to an end by successive Turkish governments through renewed strategies of destruction.

The 1993 ceasefire mediated by Talabani

In the autumn of 1992, the Turkish state launched a military operation against the guerrilla forces, aligning itself with both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). After 45 days of intense fighting, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party reached an agreement with the KDP and the PUK and withdrew a significant portion of its armed forces to Zelê and areas within the Turkish border. On 19 March 1993, Abdullah Öcalan held a press conference in the Beqaa Valley, with PUK leader Jalal Talabani also present, and declared the PKK’s first unilateral ceasefire. The ceasefire was initiated through the mediation of Jalal Talabani, at the request of then-President Turgut Özal. Although the Turkish state made no move toward a reciprocal ceasefire, the PKK, following its internal evaluation of the situation, decided to extend the unilateral ceasefire for one more month. This extension was announced once again at a press conference in Beqaa on 15 April 1993, with Talabani present. Before the ceasefire period expired, Turgut Özal died under suspicious circumstances. On the other hand, 33 conscripted soldiers who had recently completed their military service were killed on the orders of Şemdin Sakık, known for his role within counter-guerrilla and factionalist circles. Mr. Öcalan described both Özal’s death and the 33-soldier incident as deliberate provocations, which ultimately brought the unilateral ceasefire to an end.

Ceasefire with the KDP and Turkey

The PKK was growing and steadily gaining strength. Unable to halt this rapid development, the Turkish state began pressuring the United States and other international powers to turn the parties in Southern Kurdistan (Başurê Kurdistan) against the PKK. Through the diplomatic process in Dublin, Turkey secured political backing from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) and prepared to launch a new war against the PKK with the military support of both the KDP and the PUK. However, on 26 August 1995, the PKK launched an armed offensive against KDP forces, effectively rendering the Dublin process void. The clashes between the KDP and the PKK lasted three months and came to an end with a ceasefire declared on 11 December. Refusing to limit the ceasefire to intra-Kurdish dynamics, Abdullah Öcalan sought to pave the way for a political solution to the Kurdish question and extended the ceasefire unilaterally to include Turkey. Yet the Turkish state did not respond positively and showed no intention of pursuing a peaceful resolution. When, on 6 May 1996, a failed assassination attempt was carried out against Mr. Öcalan by a team associated with Tansu Çiller, the prevailing view within the PKK became that continuing the ceasefire was no longer possible.

The 1998 ceasefire during the Erbakan period

The Turkish state had begun taking steps to push for a unilateral ceasefire from the PKK. Then-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was in favour of such a move. Through indirect channels, Turkey conveyed to the PKK a proposal suggesting the establishment of a mechanism to develop the ceasefire process and to prepare both Kurdish and Turkish public opinion for peace. These discussions, conveyed to Abdullah Öcalan, ultimately led to the PKK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire on 1 September 1998.

The international conspiracy

In early October, then-Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, Atilla Ateş, made threatening statements near the Syrian border, while United States warships stationed in the Mediterranean signaled the possibility of war between Turkey and Syria. As pressure on Syria increased, Mr. Öcalan was forced to leave the country on 9 October. Despite the international conspiracy that unfolded, the unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK continued. However, the intensifying attacks against the guerrilla forces—combined with the ongoing effects of the conspiracy—effectively brought the ceasefire to an end.

On 15 February 1999, Abdullah Öcalan was abducted in Kenya and handed over to Turkey. At the time, during its 6th Congress, the PKK announced the end of the unilateral ceasefire and declared a total war. In Kurdistan, across Turkey, and in every place where Kurds lived, the protests and actions ignited like wildfire. Unable to contain the escalating resistance and clashes, the Turkish state was eventually forced to retreat.

The first ceasefire after the conspiracy

On 1 September 1999, the PKK declared its fourth ceasefire in an effort to create a peaceful environment and announced its decision to withdraw guerrilla forces from within Turkey’s borders. Responding to Mr. Öcalan’s call, the PKK also sent two peace delegations of 20 people each—one from the mountains, the other from Europe—as a gesture of goodwill to Turkey. Attacks on guerrilla zones had decreased, and Turkey did not appear to be pressing for an invasion of Southern Kurdistan. However, the coalition government formed by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP) sought to exploit the global war on terror that followed the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers. In time, the conditions necessary to maintain the ceasefire gradually disappeared.

The democratic peace project

As part of the Democratic Peace Project adopted during its 7th Extraordinary Congress, the PKK continued to issue calls for peace and pursue avenues for dialogue at various stages, presenting proposals aimed at a resolution. On 20 January 2000, it announced the Peace Project; on 4 November 2000, the Emergency Action Plan for Democracy and Peace; on 19 June 2001, a declaration of urgent demands to prevent a renewed war and to advance the peace process; and on 22 November 2002, the Declaration for an Urgent Solution. In addition, the PKK sent two open letters, one in early 2000 and the other at the end of 2002, to the President of the Republic, the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and all political parties, outlining its views on how to resolve the Kurdish question. Despite the PKK’s consistent efforts toward peace, Turkey’s policy of annihilation continued without pause. The Turkish state interpreted the PKK’s calls for peace and dialogue as signs of weakness and instead chose to escalate its policy of violence against the Kurdish people and guerrilla forces.

The 1 June initiative

In July 2003, the Assembly of KADEK held a meeting in which it outlined a three-phase roadmap aimed at establishing conditions for a ceasefire and ultimately achieving a disarmament process. In the final declaration of the meeting, KADEK warned that 'if the Turkish state does not accept this roadmap, war will escalate.' However, Turkey’s military operations continued throughout this period, along with growing pressure on Abdullah Öcalan. In response, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) announced on 1 June 2004 that they were ending the unilateral ceasefire and would begin exercising their right to retaliation. This phase led to the conclusion that any meaningful ceasefire had to be reciprocal. As a result, the guerrilla forces adopted a position based on legitimate self-defense and declared their right to respond to attacks. This marked the effective end of the ceasefire that had been in place since 1 September 1999.

A new solution project from KKK

One of the most critical moments in the ongoing war and search for a solution between the Turkish state and the PKK came in 2004. After the Kurdish Freedom Movement shifted to active self-defense on 1 June 2004 in response to Turkey’s continued policy of annihilation, Turkey began to face growing criticism—both from within its own society and from the international community—for being the unjust party in the conflict. Recognizing Turkey’s deepening political impasse, the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Komalên Kurdistan, KKK) introduced a new peace proposal composed of ten points. the KKK also presented six of these points—those it described as the most reasonable and closest to a resolution—as the basis for its decision to declare a ceasefire.

War mandate and invasion campaign

In the new phase that began with the Washington Agreement on 5 November 2007, the Turkish parliament issued a war mandate. The occupying Turkish army repeatedly bombed the Medya Defense Areas and, for the first time, launched a ground invasion into Southern Kurdistan and the Medya Defense Areas on 21 February 2008. The invasion was met with fierce guerrilla resistance in the Zap area, where the Turkish military suffered a significant defeat.

KCK’s 2009 declaration of non-engagement

The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) declared a period of non-engagement, effective as of 13 April, in light of the political outcome of the 29 March local elections. In response, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the Turkish state launched a political extermination campaign targeting the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The non-engagement decision, initially set to expire on 1 June, was extended until the end of the Ramadan holiday. Despite the KCK’s efforts to de-escalate, the occupying Turkish army continued its annihilation-oriented attacks, and the state's violence against the Kurdish population intensified. The Turkish state’s approach ultimately led to the obstruction and breakdown of the process.

Peace delegations once again

Abdullah Öcalan once again stepped in to open a path forward in the process, calling for the formation and dispatch of three peace delegations to Turkey. Responding to this call, the KCK announced that groups would be sent from Qandil, Makhmour, and Europe. On 19 October, the peace delegations from Qandil and Makhmour entered Turkey through the Xabur Border Gate and were welcomed by millions. However, the delegation from Europe was prevented from travelling by the Turkish state. Following the arrival of the peace groups in Turkey, pressure from the police and judiciary increased sharply. Legal cases were launched, and some members of the peace groups were arrested. Others returned to Southern Kurdistan as conditions for remaining in Turkey were no longer viable. Under the political extermination campaign led by the AKP government, 1,700 people—including former members of parliament, mayors, and representatives of institutions—were arrested and imprisoned. The DTP was shut down, and its co-chairs were stripped of their parliamentary status.

Öcalan’s 2010 decision

On 31 May 2010, Abdullah Öcalan announced that he was stepping out of the process, citing the collapse of political avenues for a solution and the ruling AKP strategy of delay and deception. The KCK declared on 1 June 2010 that both their leadership and Öcalan’s efforts toward peace and a democratic solution had been deliberately obstructed by the AKP. As a result, the KCK announced the end of the unilateral non-engagement decision declared on 13 April 2009 and stated that their forces would now adopt a position of active self-defense.

A 70-day period of intense clashes followed. The Turkish public was confronted with heavy fighting and significant casualties, making the conflict the central issue in national discourse. In response to the escalating violence, civil society organizations, the DTK, and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) issued calls for a mutual ceasefire. In this context, Abdullah Öcalan proposed to the KCK that a new phase of non-engagement be initiated as a step toward restarting the negotiation process. The KCK accepted both the calls made by civil society and Öcalan’s proposal.

KCK’s eighth ceasefire declaration

The KCK announced a 40-day unilateral non-engagement decision with the following statement to the public: “Öcalan has made clear that his stance remains aligned with the path of peace, and that he would be ready to intervene and play his role if a sincere and serious approach toward a resolution were to emerge. As a result of a renewed environment of dialogue, Öcalan has once again called on all sides to avoid allowing the conflict to reach an irreversible stage. For this purpose, he sent a message to the executive body of our movement.”

The KCK also outlined the conditions under which this unilateral ceasefire could become mutual. The statement included demands such as the cessation of military and political operations, the release of approximately 1,700 political prisoners, the initiation of a negotiation process with the active participation of Öcalan, and the lowering of the 10 percent electoral threshold, among other points.

The 2013 ceasefire and Dolmabahçe

After the 12 June 2011 general elections, the ruling AKP calculated that it could move forward with the dismantling of the PKK. However, as a new election cycle approached toward the end of 2012, the AKP initiated contact with Abdullah Öcalan. At the same time, the Turkish state carried out the Paris assassination, targeting Kurdish women revolutionaries, while attempting to shift the blame onto the Gülenist network. In response, Öcalan said, “If that is the claim, then let what is necessary be done,” expressing his intent to move forward with a new process. This led to the development of a three-phase roadmap, beginning with a rapid withdrawal of forces. A dialogue process began with the 2013 Newroz declaration and continued until 2015.

While the PKK was preparing for a strategic move against the genocidal system, the Islamic State (ISIS) launched widespread attacks starting in June 2014, which deeply destabilized the region. On 30 October 2014, at a meeting of the National Security Council, the Turkish state adopted a renewed comprehensive special war strategy and began preparing the so-called 'Collapse Action Plan.' The losses suffered by ISIS in Kobanê and Shengal caused panic within the AKP government, which sought to end the dialogue process out of fear.

After the 2015 Newroz celebrations, President Erdoğan made his intentions clear, declaring: “There is no Dolmabahçe Agreement, no Imralı meetings—nothing at all,” effectively signaling the return to war. Leading up to the 7 June general elections, attacks were launched against the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) rallies, buildings, and supporters in Çukurova, Diyarbakır (Amed), and the Black Sea region. On 20 July, the Suruç Massacre took place. These acts of violence were directly attributed to the AKP government. The gains made by the Kurdish movement in the June elections in Northern (Bakur) Kurdistan and the defeat of ISIS in Rojava prompted the Turkish state to act. On 24 July 2015, the AKP government officially ended the dialogue process and launched a full-scale war.

Later, on 10 October 2015, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in an effort to ensure that the snap elections of 1 November could take place in a peaceful and secure atmosphere. However, the Turkish state responded to this ceasefire with further attacks.

Ceasefire declared after the earthquakes

The armed struggle against attacks continued uninterrupted for ten years. On 6 February 2023, two powerful earthquakes centered in Marash struck the region, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands and the displacement of millions. In response to this humanitarian disaster, the KCK declared a unilateral ceasefire. The Turkish state, however, disregarded the crisis and escalated its genocidal attacks on guerrilla zones, including the use of prohibited chemical weapons.

New call and PKK’s ceasefire declaration

In response to a statement made by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli in October 2025, Mr. Öcalan declared, “If the conditions are created, I possess the theoretical and practical strength to shift the war into a legal and political framework.” Shortly after, Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan visited Imralı and held a meeting with Öcalan. Upon his recommendation, the delegation from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) visited political parties in Turkey and Southern Kurdistan. The outcomes of these visits were conveyed to Öcalan during a second meeting. Following their third visit to Imralı on 26 February, the delegation travelled to Istanbul and shared Öcalan’s historic 'Call for Peace and a Democratic Society' with the public:

“The PKK was born into the harsh reality of the twentieth century—the most violent century in history—shaped by two world wars, the global Cold War, the collapse of real socialism, and the denial of Kurdish existence. Above all, it emerged in a context where freedom, especially freedom of expression, was brutally suppressed.

In terms of theory, program, strategy, and tactics, the PKK was profoundly influenced by the dominant model of real socialism during that era. With the collapse of real socialism in the 1990s and the subsequent loosening of identity denial within the country, including some advances in freedom of expression, the PKK gradually began to suffer from a loss of meaning and excessive repetition. As a result, like similar movements of its time, it has reached the end of its life and must be dissolved.

Kurdish–Turkish relations are shaped by a shared history of over a thousand years. Turks and Kurds have maintained their existence through mutual solidarity, often forming alliances to resist hegemonic powers.

The last two hundred years of capitalist modernity have sought to destroy this alliance. Influenced by class dynamics, various forces have come to serve this destructive goal. The homogenising interpretations of the Republic have only accelerated this process. Today, the fragile state of this historical relationship must be restored with a spirit of brotherhood, and in doing so, religious beliefs should not be ignored.

The need for a democratic society is undeniable. The reason the PKK, one of the longest and most comprehensive uprisings in the history of the Republic, gained strength and support is because democratic political channels were closed.

Outcomes such as the emergence of a separate nation-state, federation, administrative autonomy, or culturalist solutions, often seen as natural results of hyper-nationalist breakdown, cannot offer answers in line with historical social realities.

Respect for identities, freedom of expression, and the right to democratic organisation, as well as the right for all segments of society to construct their own socio-economic and political structures, can only be guaranteed within the existence of a democratic society and political system.

The second century of the Republic can only achieve lasting and fraternal continuity if it is crowned with democracy. There is no path to lasting peace and renewal other than democracy. There cannot be. Democratic reconciliation is the essential method.

The language of this new era, an era of peace and democratic society, must be developed in accordance with reality.

In this climate, shaped by the call made by Mr. Devlet Bahçeli, the political will demonstrated by the President, and the positive responses from other political parties, I now issue a call for disarmament and assume full historical responsibility for this call.

As would be expected from any modern political organization that has not been forcibly eradicated, the PKK must voluntarily hold a congress, decide to disarm, and declare its dissolution in order to integrate with the state and society.

To all those who believe in coexistence and hear my call, I extend my greetings.”

PKK responded positively without delay

Within 24 hours of the declaration, the PKK issued a positive response. It announced that a congress would be convened and a decision to dissolve would be made and also declared a ceasefire. The Headquarters Command of the People's Defense Center stated that all its forces would comply with the ceasefire decision within Turkey. However, one month later, the government led by AKP has neither respected the ceasefire nor taken steps to create the necessary conditions for the congress to convene. Parliament has not yet taken any initiative, and the Kurdish People's Leader (Abdullah Öcalan) has not been granted the freedom to act—including the right to lead and organize the congress.